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University of Pittsburgh, 2019
This dissertation contains essays in macroeconomics and public economics. In the first es-
say, I analyze the interaction between student debt and occupational choice. In recent times,
student debt has grown the most among any other types of debt in the US. Student debt can
have distortionary behavioral effects and one such effect is in occupational choice. In this pa-
per, I construct a model of occupational choice between being an entrepreneur and a worker
and examine how occupational choice is affected by repayment plans available to students.
Since entrepreneurship is inherently riskier than becoming a worker, a debt repayment plan
that takes into account the income level of the borrower can have an effect on occupational
choice. I find that while repayment plans do not change the rate of entrepreneurship in the
aggregate, there is substantial change in the composition of entrepreneurs by age.
In the second essay, I study the quantitative effects of the decline in price of investment
goods on the process of structural change and economic growth. Using the Korean economy
to calibrate a canonical two-sector model of growth, I study labor allocations in agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors. The model is able to match several features of the economy
and has implications for sectoral value-added and employment shares, GDP per capita and
investment. In particular, I find that the decline in the price of investment goods decreases
the value-added and employment shares in the agricultural sector and increases the level of
GDP per capita and investment.
In the third essay, I provide estimates for the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to marginal tax rates using the publicly available Current Population Survey (CPS) dataset.
In contrast to studies that use datasets on tax returns that are not publicly available, I use
the panel structure of the CPS and exploit tax reforms in the US to employ an instrumental
variables approach to study how taxable income responds to changes in tax rates. I find that
the elasticity of taxable income is 0.65 for married couples.
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1.0 Student Debt and Entrepreneurship: The Effect of Repayment Plans on
Entrepreneurial Activity
1.1 Introduction
An increase in the demand for higher education in the US has led to a surge in student
loans. After home mortgages, aggregate student loan is now the largest among private
consumer debts. As figure (1) shows, its size has swollen to over 1.3 trillion dollars. While
student loan allows one to pursue and reap the benefits of higher education, it also adds
to the financial burden after graduation. The US government has also recognized this as a
problem faced by young individuals.1 This financial burden can have distortionary effects
on student’s behavior, which can exacerbate the situation for the borrower. In this paper, I
consider one such distortionary effect of student loan - occupational choice.
Figure 1: Consumer debt. Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax
This paper focuses on two types of occupation - entrepreneurship and workers.2 A recent
paper by Krishnan and Wang (2017) uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
1See “Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of Student Debt”, Executive
Office of the President of the United States, July 2016
2I refer to wage earners simply as workers.
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to show that having student debt can negatively affect the decision of individuals to start
their businesses. They use the Higher Education Amendments of 1992, which made student
loan more easily accessible, as an exogenous shock to debt holders to study the causal effect
of debt on start up decisions. Using data from the Country Business Patterns (CBP), the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax and the decennial census,
Ambrose et al. (2015) find a negative correlation between changes in student loan debt and
business formation. Outside of academia, the impact of student debt on entrepreneurship is
being discussed in the popular media as well.3
Student loan can affect occupational choice for a number of reasons. By nature, en-
trepreneurship is a risky venture and income is uncertain (Hall and Woodward (2010), Iyigun
and Owen (1998)). Having student loan that requires repayment of fixed amount can bring
net income even lower in the event of a negative income shock. Risk averse agents prefer to
avoid such income fluctuations. Starting a business also requires personal funds and in the
presence of student loan, asset accumulation can be more difficult.
The objective of the paper is to study occupational choice under different debt repayment
plans available to students. In particular, I compare the default standard repayment plan,
which requires repayment of a fixed amount until the debt is paid off with an income-based
repayment plan, which makes repayment contingent on income. Since entrepreneurship
is generally a riskier venture than being a worker, it is natural to think that the repay-
ment structure would affect the decisions of debt holders. In fact, in an effort to boost
entrepreneurship in the country, the Small Business Association (SBA) of the US encour-
ages selecting the income-based repayment plan.4
I construct a life-cycle model with schooling and occupational choices. Schooling re-
quires external finance, which is provided by student loan. Occupational choice is made
between becoming a worker and an entrepreneur. In the model, the two repayment plans
are introduced as two different regimes. I find that the aggregate rate of entrepreneurship
does not change much in the two different regimes but the composition of entrepreneurs
3For instance, “Student-Loan Load Kills Startup Dreams”, by Ruth Simon, Wall Street Journal, Aug 13,
2013
4See “https://www.sba.gov/startupamerica/student-startup-plan”. Their catch-phrase is “Defer loans,
not entrepreneurship.”
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are affected. In comparing the repayment plans, the life-cycle of the agents can be divided
into three phases: (i) right after graduation and before repayments are over under standard
repayment; (ii) between the period when repayment is over under standard repayment and
the period when repayment is over under income-based repayments; (iii) period following
repayment under income-based repayments. In the first phase, there are more entrepreneurs
when repayments are income-based, but in the second phase the situation is the opposite.
In the third phase towards the end of the life-cycle the rates of entrepreneurship start to
converge under the two repayment plans. I also find that once repayments are over, rates of
entrepreneurship converge relatively quickly suggesting the absence of severe scarring effects
of debt repayments. Welfare analysis shows that there is a welfare increase of 0.69% under
income-based repayment plans compared to the standard repayments.
Related Literature
The paper is motivated by declining entrepreneurial activity in the US, as reported by
Decker et al. (2014). Using different measures, Decker and co-authors conclude that there
has been a steady decline in business dynamism in the US.5 The paper is also related to
a burgeoning literature on the relationship of entrepreneurship and the macroeconomy. In
particular, the model developed in this paper builds off of the model in Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), who study the role of entrepreneurship in explaining the wealth distribution in the
US. Similar models, which incorporate incomplete markets in the tradition of Bewley and
distinguish entrepreneurs from workers have been used to study TFP losses by Buera et al.
(2011) and Moll (2014). Similar to these papers, I also build a model with financial constraint
to the entrepreneurs, which will be instrumental in driving some of the results. However,
unlike these papers I build a model where entrepreneurship is risky. In that sense, the paper
is closer to Angeletos (2007) and Mendoza et al. (2009).
The paper also contributes to the literature on student debt and its effects.6 Among other
recent quantitative papers, Ionescu (2009) looks at the implications of repayments of student
loan on college enrollment and default rates. Ji (2018) looks at the job search behavior of
5Karahan and Pugsley (2015) and Kopecky (2017) point to the role of demographics in this decline.
Kozeniauskas (2017) finds that skill-biased technical change and increase in fixed costs can explain the
decline.
6Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2015) provides a survey of the literature.
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those with student loans and finds significant effects. Using the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youths (NLSY) and the Baccalaureate and Beyond (B & B), Weidner (2016) documents
that college graduates tend to have lower wage rate when their debt amount is higher. This,
however, is not conclusive. Using the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey,
Minicozzi (2005) shows that higher educational debt is associated with higher initial wage
rate the year after finishing college. Similarly, Field (2009) and Rothstein and Rouse (2011)
also find that student loan induces student to choose high paying jobs7.
1.2 Overview of Student Debt in the US
As costs of attending college have increased in the US, the fraction of people using student
loan has increased as well. The federal student loan was first introduced in 1958 under the
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) to assist students in select disciplines. Through
the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program initiated in 1965, the government
created guaranteed loans that were provided by private lenders. Later, the Higher Education
Amendments of 1992 made subsidized and unsubsidized loans more readily available to
students. Since 2010 following the passage of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, the government has stopped providing loan guarantees and instead provides
direct loans through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Student Loan (FDSL) Program.
The federal government provides different types of loans. Among them the most popular
is the Stafford loans. These loans are either subsidized or unsubsidized and account for
around 70 percent of total loans.8 If subsidized, the government pays the interest on the
loans when the student is at school, for six months after graduation (known as grace period)
and during approved periods of deferment. Deferments can be made when unemployed, while
in military services etc. There is a lifetime limit of $31000 and $57000 for dependent and
independent undergraduates respectively. The second most popular type of federal loan,
7The results are case studies and hence not nationally representative. While Field attributes her result
to debt aversion, Rothstein and Rouse argue that the result is more consistent with credit constraints.
Rothstein and Rouse also find evidence that student debt affects academic decisions during college.
8Collegeboard (2017)
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accounting for around 20 percent of the aggregate loan, is the Federal Direct Plus Loan,
which is granted to parents of dependent undergraduates and graduate students. Finally,
Perkins loans are provided to students who are in high financial need. It accounts for less
than 3 percent of all loans. In this paper, we only consider federal loans provided directly
by the government. Private loans exists as well but in recent years, they have accounted for
only around 10 percent of total loans.9 Also, since federal loans are less costly compared
to private loans, students likely take out private loans only after they have exhausted their
options for federal loan.
As was mentioned earlier, student loan has now grown rapidly in size. In 2015-16, around
60 percent of all college graduates (public and private non-profit universities) borrowed an
average of $28,400.10 Unlike most other debts, student debt is particularly burdensome
because it is not dischargeable through bankruptcy. When students miss their payments
they enter delinquency and after 270 days of delinquency they default. The consequences of
a default are rather severe and can lead to wage garnishment and tax withholding. According
to the Department of Education,11 around 12 percent of those who entered repayment in
2013-14 defaulted on their loans.
Repayment
The government allows multiple federal loans to be consolidated into a single loan. The
standard repayment plan requires a fixed amount to be repaid every month for ten years.
This is the default repayment plan and in 2017 around 50 percent of the students opted
for it. Graduated repayment is also available that allows students to start out by paying a
smaller amount and the amount increases gradually. This repayment also goes on for ten
years like the standard repayment plan.
Under FFEL and FDSL programs, there are income-driven repayment plans available as
well. Through the Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, income-driven repayment plan was
first introduced in 1994. Currently, there are four types of income-driven plans: Pay as You
Earn (PAYE), Revised Pay as You Earn (REPAYE), Income-Based Repayment (IBR) and
9See Collegeboard (2017)
10Collegeboard (2017)
11See https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-national-student-loan-
fy-2014-cohort-default-rate
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the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR). These repayment plans differ in their eligibility
requirements, repayment periods and fraction of income that needs to be paid. Income-driven
repayments have progressively become more generous. For example, following a presidential
memorandum in 2014, students pay only 10% of their discretionary income under IBR,
compared to 15% in prior years. Table (1) shows the different structures of repayment plans
available to students.
Income-driven repayments can relieve students who are financially burdened and yet
many chose not to use it, while default rate was relatively high. However, enrollment rate
was low for a long time. Dynarski and Kreisman (2012) suggest this could be due to the
high time cost and effort required in switching from the default standard repayment plan to
income-based plans. In 2012, only around 5 percent of the borrowers chose income-driven
repayments. However, this rate is increasing now, partly due to governmental initiatives.12
Close to 28 percent now choose income driven payments.1314
Payment Amount Period Eligibility Forgiveness
Standard Fixed 10 years All No
REPAYE 10% of discretionary in-
come
20 years Direct Stafford
Loans
20 years
PAYE 10% of discretionay in-
come
20 years Direct Stafford loans
after Oct. 1, 2007
20 years
IBR 10/15% of discretionary
income
20/25 years FFEL/Direct
Stafford loans
20/25 years
ICR 20% of discretionary in-
come
25 years Stafford/PLUS loans 25 years
Table 1: Repayment plans. Source: U.S. Department of Education
12See “Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of Student Debt”, Executive
Office of the President of the United States, July 2016
13Collegeboard (2017)
14Check figure (24) in the appendix for an example of payment under standard repayment and income-
based repayment.
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1.3 Entrepreneurs
The literature on entrepreneurship characterizes an entrepreneur in several ways. The
Schumpeterian view is that an entrepreneur is someone who brings new ideas, innovates and
disrupts the economy. Congruent to this view of entrepreneurship, Levine and Rubinstein
(2017) define entrepreneurs as those who run incorporated companies. They find that those
having incorporated businesses also tend to have cognitive and non-cognitive abilities that
exceed those who own unincorporated businesses.
A second way of studying entrepreneurs is simply by looking at the self-employed. For
example, Hamilton (2000) and Evans and Leighton (1989) analyze the self-employed. In
many publicly available datasets like the Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths (NLSY), the
self-employed and their demographic information are readily available, which makes it easier
to analyze them.
In this paper, I consider an individual who is described as self-employed in the CPS to
be an entrepreneur. Fig (2) shows the rate of self-employment by age. Most people become
self-employed when they are older but there is still a significant fraction of self-employed
who are younger, the group most likely to be burdened by student loan.
Figure 2: Rate of entrepreneurship by age. Source: Current Population Survey (CPS)
I focus on the self-employed for a few reasons. First of all, the entrepreneur in the
paper is not confined to those who disrupt markets and innovate. Instead, we are concerned
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with those who choose not to become wage earners. The self-employed captures this group.
Secondly, even if we were to concern with just the talented entrepreneurs by considering just
the incorporated, for example, it could omit many of the entrepreneurs who start out small,
owning unincorporated firms, but later grow their businesses and incorporate. Figure (3) is
consistent with this narrative. Younger entrepreneurs tend to be unincorporated. Since the
earlier periods of an entrepreneur’s life-cycle is most likely going to be affected by student
debt, it is important that we consider the unincorporated self-employed as well. It is also
true that student loan may not affect every type of entrepreneur. For example, someone who
inherits a well established business from his/her parents may not be affected by having to pay
their student debt. However, it is difficult to isolate the types of entrepreneurs who might
be affected by student debt. Since the self-employed encompasses all types of entrepreneurs,
it is a safe definition in the sense that it does not miss those potential entrepreneurs who
might be affected by debt. Of course, it comes with the caveat that those who might be
unaffected by debt are also included. Tables (20) and (21) lists the fraction of entrepreneurs
by occupation and industry.
Figure 3: Fraction of incorporated entrepreneurs. Source: CPS
Entrepreneurs generally earn less on average. As seen in figure (4), it is clear that
there is a higher proportion of individuals with very low or negative income. 15 The low
average income for entrepreneurs is consistent with findings in Hurst and Pugsley (2011)
15For entrepreneur’s income I use the variable ’INCBUS’, which ”indicates each respondent’s net pre-
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and Hamilton (2000) that non-pecuniary reasons are just as important in becoming an
entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurs could be earning less for other reasons as well.16 E.g.
young firms might have to go through a period of low levels of revenue before they start
making profits. Exploring why average income levels are lower for entrepreneurs is beyond
the scope of the paper.
Figure 4: Income distribution for entrepreneurs and workers. Source: CPS
Entrepreneurship by College Education
Below, figure (5) shows the rates of entrepreneurship by college education. Between 2000
and 2017, the rate of entrepreneurship for those without college degree has fallen by 5.5%,
whereas for those with college degree the rate has fallen by 22%. While not conclusive,
income-tax non-farm business and/or professional practice income for the previous calendar year”. For the
wage earner’s income, I use ’INCWAGE’, which ”indicates each respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary
income–that is, money received as an employee–for the previous calendar year”.
16The income is self-reported. It is also possible that the self-employed under-report their earnings. But
even with mis-reporting it is hard to dismiss that entrepreneurs earn less than workers because the fraction
of people who earn less than $10,000 is significantly higher for entrepreneurs.
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the rapid rise in student loan might have played a part in the relatively higher decline in
entrepreneurship for college graduates.
Figure 5: Rates of entrepreneurship. Source: CPS
1.4 Model
The key ingredients of the model are occupational and schooling choices. I build the
model from the frameworks in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Buera et al. (2011). I
construct an overlapping generations model by adding life-cycle to their model. Although
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) also has life-cycle, they model it in a perpetual youth framework.
Time is discrete and agents live for J periods. There is a measure one of agents in the
economy. Measure 1
J
of agents are born each period and the same measure of agents die.
There is no retirement period in the model. At age 1, the agents make schooling choice and
at each age subsequently choose to become a worker or an entrepreneur.
Agents receive flow utility from consumption u(cj) at each age j. The utility function
u(.) satisfies the standard conditions u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞ and limc→∞ u′(c) = 0.
In period J , agents receive utility from bequest b. In addition to utility from consumption
and bequest, each agent suffers a psychic cost κ by attending college. Using such psychic
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costs to capture college enrollment is common in the literature17. Agents aim to maximize
their expected lifetime utility
E
J∑
j=1
βju(cj) + β
Jv(b)− κI{college=1}
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and I{college=1} is an indicator function which equals 1 if the
agent attends college and 0 otherwise. The subscripts and superscripts are avoided wherever
it is possible to do so without confusion.
College Choice
Agents are born with wealth level y0, schooling cost f and disutility from attending college
κ. These are drawn from a joint distribution F (y0, f, κ). Agents are also characterized by
their entrepreneurial ability z ∈ Z = [z,∞). In the first period all agents start out with
z = z.
There are many ways in which schooling cost is covered in reality. There are grants,
scholarships, parental contributions and so on. For ease of modeling, I assume that the
schooling cost f is any pecuniary cost left after other sources, besides student loan and
personal wealth, are used. Thus, student loan d is determined using
d = max{f − y0, 0}
Let Uc(y0, κ, f) be the expected utility of going to college and Unc(y0) be the expected utility
of not going to college. The agent chooses to go to college if
Uc(y0, κ, f) ≥ Unc(y0).
Debt Repayment
Student debt holders face an exogenously determined interest rate, rd
18. The debt is
repaid at the end of every period using the standard repayment plan. Under this plan, a
fixed amount is paid every period for the first ten periods. The standard repayment amount
17See Heckman et al. (1998)
18Unlike Ionescu (2009), I abstract from shocks to the interest rate. Prior to 2006, interest rates on
student loan could change over time. However, in recent years, interest rates are fixed at the level that was
determined during the time of borrowing.
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is calculated using the simple interest formula and is given by
payj =
rd
(1 + rd)
[
1− 1
(1 + rd)10−(j−1)
]dj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 10 (1.1)
The debt level evolves according to
d′ = (1 + rd)(d− pay). (1.2)
Once the repayment periods are over, d = 0.
Timeline and Choices
For ease of exposition, I begin by explaining the sequence of events starting from the
second period. The agent starts out with the vector of state variables (y, z, d, j, s) where y is
wealth, z is entrepreneurial ability, d is outstanding student debt, j is age and s is education
level. The state variable s takes the following values
s =
1 if agent has college education0 if agent does not have college education
Figure (6) explains the sequence of events for an educated agent within a period.
Figure 6: Sequence of events after first period
The first choice that the agent makes is on the division of wealth into consumption c and
risk-free asset a,
c+ a = y
Following the consumption-savings decision, the agent makes his decision on occupation. He
can either become a worker or an entrepreneur. Workers earn a wage that is determined by
his education level. If the agent has college education, he becomes a skilled worker and can
earn wage ws, whereas if the agent didn’t go to college, he becomes an unskilled worker who
earns wu. We let
ws = h¯wu,
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where h¯ denotes the skill premium. In the data, there is an age profile for wages that initially
grows and declines towards the end of the life-cycle. This is usually explained through on
the job training as in Ben-Porath (1967) or learning by doing as in Imai and Keane (2004).
However, since in the present model agents switch between occupations over time, these
forces are hard to incorporate. As a simplifying assumption, I let wages to remain constant
over time but differ across educational groups. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) make a similar
assumption in their life-cycle model of occupational choice.
If the agent chooses to become an entrepreneur, he invests capital k into the following
technology
z′kν + (1− δ)k
where ν ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter dictating the marginal return on investment. z′ is a random
entrepreneurial ability, which realizes after the capital investment is made. As can be seen in
figure (6) ability is realized within the period. Entrepreneurial ability is persistent and the
z at the beginning of the period works as a signal for what level of ability will be realized.
In particular, following Buera et al. (2011), I assume that with probability γ, z remains
unchanged and with probability 1 − γ a new ability is drawn from the distribution ηi(z),
where i ∈ {c, nc}.
Income uncertainty is a crucial element in the model. The time-line for occupational
choice introduces uncertainty in becoming an entrepreneur, which is different from Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006) and Buera et al. (2011), where capital is chosen after entrepreneurial
ability is realized. This simplifies the problem by making the entrepreneur’s capital choice a
static problem - producing analytical solutions. Introducing income uncertainty makes the
problem dynamic and much more complicated19.
The agent pays a tax on the wage/profits at the rate τ and makes debt repayments.
Using pi′ = z′kν − (r + δ)k, wealth next period is given by
y′ =
(1− τ)pi
′(z′, k) + (1 + r)a− pay for entrepreneur
(1− τ)wi + (1 + r)a− pay for worker
19A similar structure to this paper is found in Glover and Short (2015).
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An entrepreneur can borrow for capital but he cannot choose infinite levels of capital.
In particular, the entrepreneur is restricted by the constraint
(1− τ)(zkν − (r + δ)k) + (1 + r)a− pay > 0.
The constraint implies that entrepreneurs cannot borrow at a level which will leave him with
negative wealth next period. Borrowing is done within a period. There is no inter-temporal
borrowing, i.e. a ≥ 0.
In the first period, agents do not consume and start out with z = z. The rest of the
decisions are the same as after the first period. The following tree figure demonstrates the
decisions made.
Figure 7: Sequence of events in the first period
Corporate Sector
The model also features a representative corporate sector that operates the following
production function
Yc = ZcK
αH1−α
where Zc, K and H are productivity, physical capital and human capital respectively. The
corporate sector maximizes profit by solving
max
K,H
ZcK
αH1−α −RK − wuH
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Capital Rental Market
The rental price R satisfies
R = r + δ.
Government
The government in this economy lends to the students and spends an amount G, which
doesn’t bring any utility to the agents. It finances these expenditures by collecting payments
on the loans and taxes. The budget constraint is given by
∫
d× I{college=1} ∂y ∂f ∂κ+G =
10∑
j=1
∫
Y
∫
Z
∫
D
(p(y, z, d, j, 1)) ∂y ∂z ∂d
+
J∑
j=1
1∑
c=0
∫
Y
∫
Z
∫
D
τw + τpi(y, z, d, j, c) ∂y ∂z (1.3)
Value Functions
The value function of an agent with college degree is given by
V (y, z, d, j, 1) = max {V E(y, z, d, j, 1), V W (y, z, d, j, 1)} (1.4)
where V E and V W are value functions of the entrepreneur and the worker respectively.
The value function and the problem of the entrepreneur is given by
V E(y, z, d, j, 1) = max
c,a,k
u(c) + βEV (y′, z′, d′, j + 1, 1) (1.5)
s.t. c+ a = y
(1− τ)zkν − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a− pay > 0
y′ = (1− τ)z′kν − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a− pay
d′ = (1 + rd)(d− pay)
c > 0, y > 0
Similarly, the worker’s problem is given by
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V W (y, z, d, j, 1) = max
c,a
u(c) + βEV (y′, z′, d′, j + 1, 1) (1.6)
s.t. c+ a = y
y′ = (1− τ)ws + (1 + r)a− pay
d′ = (1 + rd)(d− pay)
c > 0, y > 0
pay is determined by equation (1.1).
Similarly, the value functions and the problems for the agents with no college are given
by
V (y, z, 0, j, 0) = max {V W (y, z, 0, j, 0), V W (y, z, 0, j, 0)}. (1.7)
The value function and the problem of the entrepreneur is given by
V E(y, z, 0, j, 0) = max
c,a,k
u(c) + βEV (y′, z′, 0, j + 1, 0) (1.8)
s.t. c+ a = y
(1− τ)zkν − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a > 0
y′ = (1− τ)z′kν − (r + δ)k + (1 + r)a
c > 0, y > 0
Similarly, the worker’s problem is given by
V W (y, z, 0, j, 0) = max
c,a
u(c) + βEV (y′, z′, 0, j + 1, 0) (1.9)
s.t. c+ a = y
y′ = (1− τ)wu + (1 + r)a
c > 0, y > 0
The utility of choosing to go to college in the beginning of the first period is given by
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Uc(y0, κ, f) = V (y, z, d, 1, 1)− κ
where
d = max{f − y0, 0}
and
y = max{y0 − f, 0}.
Similarly, the utility of choosing to not go to college is given by
Unc(y0) = V (y0, z, 0, 1, 0)
At the beginning of period 1, the agent solves
U(y0, f, κ) = max{Uc(y0, κ, f), Unc(y0)} (1.10)
1.5 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Below I define the policy functions.
o : Y × Z ×D × J × S → R+ (occupational choice)
c : Y × Z ×D × J × S → R+ (consumption choice)
a : Y × Z ×D × J × S → R+ (asset level)
k : Y × Z ×D × J × S → R+ (capital level)
s : Y × F ×K → (0, 1) (schooling choice)
Let Ω be the stationary distribution over the state variables.
Ω : Y × Z ×D × J × S → [0, 1]
A stationary competitive equilibrium is given by a set of policy functions o(y, z, d, j, s),
c(y, z, d, j, s), a(y, z, d, j, s), k(y, z, d, j, s), s(y0, f, κ) K, Ls, Lu, invariant distribution over
the state variables, Ω(y, z, d, j, s), tax rate τ and prices ws, wu, r such that:
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1. Given the prices, the policy function o(y, z, d, j, s) solves (1.4) and (1.7), policy functions
c(y, z, d, j, s), a(y, z, d, j, s), k(y, z, d, j, s) solve (1.5), (1.6), (1.8) and (1.9), and policy
function s(y0, f, κ) solves (1.10).
2. Given the prices, the corporate sector maximizes its profit. The optimal choices K and
H satisfy
R = αZcK
α−1H1−α
wu = (1− α)ZcKαH−α
3. Rental price is given by
R = r + δ
4. The government balances its budget, given by (1.3).
5. The invariant distribution is consistent with the policy functions.
6. Markets clear. I.e.
K +
∫
k(y, z, d, j, s)∂Ω(y, z, d, j, s) =
∫
a(y, z, d, j, s)∂Ω(y, z, d, j, s)
H =
∫ [
I{c=0,o(y,z,d,j,s)=w} + h¯I{c=1,o(y,z,d,j,s)=w}
]
∂Ω(y, z, d, j, s)
1.6 Quantitative Exercise
Calibration
Some of the parameters are borrowed from the literature, while others are calibrated to
match statistics in the data. A period in the model is one year in the data. I use T = 38 to
study the population between the ages 23 and 60. There is no retirement in the model.
Preferences
The economic agents derive flow utility from consumption and bequest at the end of the
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period. I use CRRA utility function for both.
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
v(b) = ζ
b1−σ
1− σ
The parameter for relative risk aversion σ is a common parameter in DSGE models.
I assign a value of 3 to σ, which is within the range of commonly used values. Lifetime
preference is also affected by the discount factor β. Following Buera et al. (2011), I assign
it a value of 0.92. ζ captures altruistic motive. To pin down the value of ζ, I follow Guren
et al. (2018) and compare the ratio of net worth for the median agent between the ages of
60 and 50.20 The values for net worth is taken from the 2016 summary variables available
in the public dataset from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
The psychic cost of college is given by κ, which is drawn from an exponential distribution.
ω(κ) = ψe−ψκ
The parameter ψ is used to match the fraction of population with a college degree. This
number averages around 33% between 2010 and 2017 in the Current Population Survey.
Technology
From Gollin (2002), the capital share α in the production function of the corporate sector
is given the value 0.33. The depreciation rate δ is assigned the value 0.06, following Buera
et al. (2011). The productivity parameter for the production function is normalized to equal
1.
Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), the parameter ν is assigned the value 0.88.
The stochastic process for entrepreneurial ability follows Buera et al. (2011). The ability
variable z persists with probability γ and with probability (1−γ) an individual draws a new
ability level from an exponential distribution, with pdf η over ability levels. The exponential
distribution has scale and given by θc if he has college education and θnc if he doesn’t.
ηi(z) = 1− e−
(z)
θi
20Guren et al. (2018) compare net worth between ages 60 and 45.
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where i ∈ {c, nc}.
In order to identify these parameters (γ, θc, θnc), I target the fraction of skilled and
unskilled individuals who are entrepreneurs, the fraction of individuals who respond having
negative business income in the Current Population Survey and the fraction of individuals
who transition out of entrepreneurship in a period. These statistics are 0.09, 0.09, 0.03 and
0.1 respectively.
The wage premium h¯ is set by comparing per capita wages of those with college education
and those without. This gives h¯ = 1.6.
The interest rate on debt, rd, faced by the student is set by federal law and is fixed. The
rate has varied over time in the data and the interest rate faced by a particular borrower is
set at the time of borrowing. Although the rate was lower in recent years to I set a value of
rd = 0.068 to be consistent with the interest rate that prevailed for the lengthiest period in
recent years. Ionescu (2009) uses the same interest rate in her analysis.
Agents draw the cost of going to college, κ, from a uniform distribution over [0, µ]. I
assume that the distribution is independent of initial wealth and pyschic cost of attending
college. µ is chosen to match the average amount of student debt at the time of graduation.
The value for average debt is taken from Hershbein and Hollenbeck (2015), who compute
the statistic using the National Postsecondary Student Aid data. They provide average debt
amount for various years but I restrict the observations to 2000 and onwards and take the
average of the available data points. The average student debt for those years is $17, 705.
This gives us a value of 9.2 for µ.
Table (2) summarizes the pre-determined parameter values.
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Parameter Value Source/Target
σ 3.0 Standard value
β 0.92 BKS (2011)
α 0.33 Gollin (2002)
δ 0.06 Standard value
rd 0.068 Ionescu (2009)
ν 0.88 Cagetti and Denardi (2006)
Zc 1.0 Normalization
T 38 38 years of working age
Table 2: Parameter values
The following table summarizes the parameter values that are obtained through calibra-
tion. Except for the ratio of net worth at ages 60 and 50, the model performs satisfactorily
in other dimensions.
Parameter Value Target Data Model
ζ 3.0 Networth ratio at ages 60 and 50 2.92 2.15
ψ 1.42 Fraction of college graduates 0.33 0.34
µ 9.2 Mean Student debt $17, 705 $17, 220
θc 0.71 Fraction of skilled entrepreneur 0.09 0.08
θnc 0.81 Fraction of unskilled entrepreneur 0.09 0.08
γ 0.94 Occupational switching rate 0.10 0.05
h¯ 1.6 Ratio of wages for skilled and unskilled 1.60 1.60
Table 3: Calibrated parameters
In evaluating the model, the rate of entrepreneurship over age is crucial because the
younger agents tend to hold more of the debt. The age profile wasn’t targeted in the
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calibration process, but the model does well in producing the rate of entrepreneurship by
age. Below, the graphs showing these rates are presented for the skilled and unskilled
populations.
Figure 8: Rate of entrepreneurship for college graduates
Figure 9: Rate of entrepreneurship for those without college degree
The model under-predicts the rates of entrepreneurship for both skilled and unskilled
agents. This is particularly the case during early periods of their lifetime. This points to the
importance of initial conditions with regards to entrepreneurship. In the model agents start
out with the lowest level of entrepreneurial ability and a wealth distribution in which most
agents have low levels of wealth. In reality, there are other factors that might contribute
to entrepreneurial choice early in one’s life. Entrepreneurial ability might be transferable
from parents to kids, which would make some young agents more able as entrepreneurs.
Likewise, some agents might inherit firms from their parents and start out as entrepreneurs
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in the very beginning of their lives. These are important dimensions that can help explain
the age profile of entrepreneurship better. In the exercise here, I am more interested in
finding the difference in the rate of entrepreneurship under different debt repayment plans,
but incorporating other dimensions that can help explain the levels of entrepreneurship will
be something to explore in the future.
Income-based Repayment
We now solve the model under income-based repayment. Under income-based repayment
plan the payment amount is given by the following formula
payj = min{0.10×max(incj − pov, 0)} 1 ≤ j ≤ 20 (1.11)
where pov is 150% of the poverty level. Under income-based repayment, any unpaid amount
after period 20 is forgiven. In reality, students are free to choose any repayment plan at any
time. In particular, they can switch between either of the repayment plans. In the exercise
here, I conduct the experiment as if the two plans were two different regimes. Until recently,
almost all of the students were enrolled in the standard repayment plan. The number of
students enrolled in the income-based plan is now increasing, and with the plans to expand
it further,21 the assumption is a first step in analyzing its effects. More importantly, this
makes the problem significantly easier to solve.22
When repayments are income-based, agents are less worried about having to repay a
hefty amount when their income is low. In the model, the borrowing constraint faced by
the entrepreneurs ensures that consumption cannot be negative, but for the same income
level, agents get to consume more when repayments are income-based compared to the
standard repayment plan. Additionally, since the borrowing constraint depends on asset
level and the lowest realization of entrepreneurial ability, the constraint is more relaxed
when repayments are income-based. Figure (10) shows how occupational choice varies under
different repayment plans by looking at the policy functions of the agents with respect to
wealth and ability levels. I fix the debt amount to $21, 000 and age to 28 years old. The
21See “Investing in Higher Education: Benefits, Challenges, and the State of Student Debt”, Executive
Office of the President of the United States, July 2016
22To make the problem computationally tractable, other papers like Ionescu (2009) and Ji (2018) allow
agents to switch once between the repayment plans.
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agents choose to become entrepreneurs to the right of the curve and choose to become workers
to the left of the curve. Generally, agents choose to become entrepreneurs when their wealth
and ability levels are high. As expected, the curve for income-based repayments is to the left
of the curve for standard repayments. The threshold levels of ability and wealth is lower for
agents with income-based repayments than those with standard repayments. The threshold
starts to merge when wealth levels are higher. This is when debt repayments as a fraction
of wealth is less significant.
Figure 10: Occupation choice (SR - standard repayment, IBR - income-based repayment)
Now we examine the general equilibrium effects of considering the repayment plans.
Standard Repayment Income-Based Repayment
College enrollment 34% 41%
Average loan $15,435 $18,323
Tax Rate 0 1.5%
Income for skilled $65,361 $60,527
Income for unskilled $38,488 $35,604
Table 4: Statistics under repayment plans
College enrollment is affected by the fact that repayments when entrepreneurial income
is low are also low. This lenient repayment plan attracts more college-goers. However,
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insurance against entrepreneurial risk is not the only motive for going to college. With the
standard repayment plan, the marginal students who decide not to go to college are those
who draw high pecuniary costs of going to college. When repayments are income-based, their
repayment amounts are only a fraction of their income, which could be lower than under
standard repayment amount during the initial years of life. When agents are impatient and
inter-temporal borrowing is not allowed like in this model, this also leads to higher college
enrollment. And since those facing higher costs are entering college, the average loan goes
up as well. Since there is an upsurge in human capital following an increase in college
enrollment, wages go down for both skilled and unskilled workers. The equilibrium interest
rate is lower than the interest rate on student loan. Therefore, under the standard repayment
plan the government does not levy any tax on the agents.
Figure (11) shows the rates of entrepreneurship for the two different repayment plans.
Entrepreneurship for those without college degree is unaffected in this experiment, so I only
focus on those who have a college degree. Under income-based repayments there is a higher
rate of entrepreneurship in the beginning. Those enrolled in standard repayments catch up
and the rates coincide towards the later part of the life-cycle.
Figure 11: Rates of entrepreneurship by repayment plans
First, we observe that under income-based repayment, there is a higher fraction of agents
choosing to become entrepreneurs when they are young. This is expected because when re-
payments have insurance built into it, agents are less reluctant to choose a riskier occupation.
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Also, when repayments are income-based the borrowing constraint for entrepreneurs are re-
laxed, which allows high ability entrepreneurs to invest more capital and therefore increase
their revenue. Also, in the above figure, observe that for standard repayments, entrepreneur-
ship starts to accelerate around the age 33. This is the age when repayments are over and
agents do not have debt anymore. On the other hand, in the case of income-based repay-
ments, agents still have repayments to make. Given that debts accumulate interest every
period, agents who hold debts prefer less risky occupation. Even though there is relief in
repayment burden, choosing to become an entrepreneur is likely to increase debt in the next
period. This is not the case in the standard repayment plan because agents will have run
down their debt. Once repayments are over in the income-based case, entrepreneurship under
both repayment plans coincide.
The fact that entrepreneurship rates catch up, initially for the standard repayments and
later for the income-based repayment suggests that tightened borrowing constraint due to
lower levels of asset may be quickly overcome. During young age under standard repayment,
for example, with lower levels of income savings are also lower, which decreases wealth
levels and constrains the entrepreneurs. However, the acceleration of entrepreneurship post
repayments suggest this effect does not last long.
In the table below, I show how entrepreneurship is affected during different phases of the
life-cycle. The different age groups reflect the points of intersection in figure (11).
Age group Standard Repayment Income-Based Repayment Percent Change
23-36 2.37% 3.09% 30.19 %
37-47 10.11% 9.11% -9.94 %
Table 5: Rates of entrepreneurship by repayment plans and ages
Notice that in the aggregate, there is little change in the rates of entrepreneurship under
the two repayment plans. However, the percent changes are substantial if we focus on just
the young entrepreneurs. This also suggests that while student debt can affect younger
entrepreneurs scarring effects are not that significant.
No College Choice
College choice and therefore debt amounts are endogenous in the model. As such, in
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comparing the repayment plans, the effects on entrepreneurship can be due to different
levels of debt carried by the agents. It then becomes unclear as to how much of the effect is
due to insurance motive or a relaxed borrowing constraint under income-based repayments.
To ensure comparability I abstract away from college choice and study the case where agents
have the same amount of debt. The only thing that changes is the repayment plans.23
Table (6) shows how the rates of entrepreneurship look like for different ages under the two
repayment plans.
Age group Standard Repayment Income-Based Repayment Percent Change
23-36 2.44% 3.19% 31.04 %
37-47 9.43% 8.94% -5.24 %
Table 6: Rates of entrepreneurship by repayment plans and ages
The percent change for different age groups and the aggregate are similar to the case
with college choice. However, the magnitude of percent change during the age group 37-47
is smaller. This is not surprising given that the agents enter college with a higher amount
of loan when we allow college choice. Under income-based repayment, this higher amount of
debt weighs more heavily on the agents during the second phase of their lives.
Welfare
In computing the welfare, I calculate the percent increase in lifetime consumption that
will make an agent indifferent between the two repayment regimes. I find that there is
a 0.69% increase in welfare under the income-based repayment compared to the standard
repayment.
In the model, agents have similar outcomes during the latter periods of their lives. How-
ever, their occupational choices are highly affected during the early years when loans are
being repaid. During the middle phase of the agent’s life, under the standard repayment
agents are debt free and can consume relatively more. Given that the discount factor is
somewhat small, the higher level of consumption feasible with the income-based repayment
during early years increases overall welfare.
23The parameters are kept the same as in calibration.
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Discussion
Policies related to repayment of loans are important as far as entrepreneurship is con-
cerned. Steps in that direction have been taken in the past. For instance, interest rate on
the loan changed from being time-varying to fixed in 2006.24 This paper analyzes the newly
introduced income-based repayments. The model in this paper suggests that while there
are compositional effects of changing repayment schemes, the rates of entrepreneurship are
similar in the aggregate. This may not necessarily be true, especially when the model does
not consider the role of experience among other things. I conjecture that adding gains in
entrepreneurial experience, which is an important aspect of any occupation, can produce
longer term dynamic benefits of income-based repayments and an overall higher levels of
entrepreneurship. In the paper there are lower rates of entrepreneurship for those in the
middle of their lifecycles. The young benefit more by having their repayments income-based.
They are the ones who generally have lower levels of wealth and are affected more by income
shocks and financing constraints. Had experience been valuable, there would be a higher
retention of entrepreneurs. The dynamic benefit could also result from entrepreneurs quick-
ening their accumulation of assets, relaxing their financing constraints and operating at more
optimal levels.
The issue of student loan is under further scrutiny given the ever-increasing costs of
attending a college. Figure (12) shows that this cost is has been increasing steadily over
the years. Unless there is an increase in other forms of financing, this increase will push
towards higher loan amount and a change in the composition of debt with high interest
private loans being more ubiquitous. A higher amount of government loan will be an even
more challenging under the standard repayment plan since the repayment amount will go
up as well. The income-based repayments can become even more important to encourage
entrepreneurship. But because the income-based repayments incur societal costs through
taxation, optimal policies might have to be revised.
24See“https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/interest-rates”
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Figure 12: Cost of college attendance. Source: Collegeboard
The decline of entrepreneurship is a concerning issue. The social costs of this phenomenon
needs to be better understood in order to design better loan-related policies. I consider a
few occupational features to study occupational choice. However, there are other possi-
ble implications of the effects of student loan on entrepreneurship. For example, entry into
entrepreneurship might be important in economic growth through innovation. Entrepreneur-
ship, with the flexibility it allows, can be liberating to those with time constraints. As a
result economic decisions like whether to have children or whether to enjoy leisure are also
affected. These are aspects related to entrepreneurship that might be affected by student
debt but are outside of the scope of the paper. Exploring these can be meaningful.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a model of occupational choice over the life-cycle - individuals can
choose to become wage earners or entrepreneurs. I study the impact of student loan on
occupational choice and how different repayment plans affect the rate of entrepreneurship. I
find that in aggregate the two types of repayment have little effect, but there is substantial
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compositional effects. In particular, under the standard repayment plan agents choose the
safer occupation, wage earner, when they are young but once the repayment period is over,
more of them choose entrepreneurship. Once the repayment periods are over for both types of
repayment, rates of entrepreneurship converge, suggesting a lack of persistent effect. Overall,
there is a small increase in welfare under the income-based repayment.
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2.0 Price of Investment Goods and Structural Change: Analysis of the
Korean Economy
2.1 Introduction
Structural change, where labor is reallocated from the agricultural to non-agricultural
sectors, is a salient feature of any growing economy. This fact was documented in their
early work by Rothbarth (1941), Chenery (1960) and Kuznets (1957), among others. More
recently, Herrendorf et al. (2014) document this phenomenon for a larger group of countries,
including those that grew rapidly in recent times like Japan and Korea. In this paper, I ex-
amine the contribution of the decline in the price of investment in structural change as well
as economic growth. In particular, the decline in the price of investment catalyzes the for-
mation of capital necessary to boost the economy and the capital-intensive non-agricultural
sector. It also has implications for output per capita and in particular output per capita
increases when the price of investment declines.
To quantify the effect of the decline in the price of investment I use the Korean economy
as a laboratory. Figures (13) and (14) show the employment and value added shares in
the agricultural sector over the time period 1970-2005.1 The data for employment share
was taken from the World Bank and the data for the value added shares was taken from
the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System. Both measures show a drastic shift in the
economy away from agriculture. This is in contrast to many of the advanced economies that
went through the process over a much longer period of time. Just before this transition in
the 1960s, the Korean economy underwent major reforms that contributed to the decline
in the price of investment. Among other reforms, the tariff on the import of capital goods
was substantially reduced (Jung-ho (1993)). The years following the introduction of these
reforms on tariff saw a gradual decline in the price of investment good. Figure (15) shows
the relative price of investment good. The Chinn-Ito index, which measures the restriction
1I restrict data to this period because the value-added share didn’t start to decline until mid-1960s.
Investment price also started declining around the same time and flattened around 2005 before the global
financial crisis.
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in cross-border financial transactions, also shows an increase in financial openness of the
Korean economy (Chinn and Ito (2006)). The normalized index, between 0 and 1, shows
the Korean economy’s index increase from 0.16 in 1970 to 0.41 in 2005 and as high as 1 in
recent years.
Figure 13: Employment share in agriculture in Korea. Source: World Bank
Figure 14: Value added share in agriculture in Korea. Source: Bank of Korea
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Figure 15: Relative price of investment. Source: Penn World Table 7.1
The model in the paper comprises of two sectors: an agricultural sector and a non-
agricultural sector.2 An important feature of the economy is that the agricultural sector
requires just labor,3 while the industrial non-agricultural sector employs both capital and
labor, combined through a constant returns to scale production function. As is common in
the literature, the agricultural good is purely for consumption, whereas the non-agricultural
good is used for consumption as well as investment. However, there is a distortion that
doesn’t allow a one-to-one conversion of consumption of the non-agricultural good to in-
vestment. Higher levels of distortion imply that capital is more expensive. As the economy
undergoes reforms, this distortion is gradually removed, which expedites the process of cap-
ital accumulation and structural change. The model also features non-homotheticity in the
preferences as in Kongsamut et al. (2001).4 There is a subsistence level of consumption of
2It is common in the literature to study three sectors, namely agricultural, manufacturing and services.
Different measures of structural change show that as a function of income, there is a downward trend in
the shares of agricultural sector, a hump shape in the manufacturing sector and an increase in the services
sector. Since this paper is concerned with the effect of the price of investment goods and the services and
manufacturing sectors tend to have the same factor shares in general, I distinguish the economy into just the
agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. Also, the commonly used Stone-Geary utility function, also used in
this paper, is less effective in capturing the hump-shape of the manufacturing share. See for example, Buera
and Kaboski (2009) and Uy et al. (2013)
3Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) show that this is not the case for an advanced country like the US.
They find that factor shares are almost equal to across sectors. However, in poorer countries, the technology
used in the agricultural sector is usually more primitive. Other papers like Gollin et al. (2007) also model
the agricultural sector as running a labor-only technology.
4With non-homothetic preferences, agricultural goods are viewed as necessities, while non-agricultural
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agricultural good, which must be produced before there is production of non-agricultural
goods. This non-homotheticity in preference is responsible for generating structural change
in the model alongside the decline in investment price.
The model is calibrated to match several features of the economy including the level of
output, investment rates, sectoral employment shares and sectoral value added shares. In
the calibration process, the level of distortion on investment is computed to match the price
of investment in the data. I then study a counterfactual experiment, where the distortion is
kept at the 1970 level, which shows that in the presence of the distortion there is a decrease
in output per capita of up to 22%, and an increase in agricultural employment shares of up
to 12%. The removal of distortion also facilitates a higher level of investment and capital
deepening.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is mostly related to the literature on structural change.5 Two popular theo-
ries that explain this empirical fact rely on non-homotheticity of preferences and differential
productivity growth between sectors as in Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides
(2007)6 respectively. The model used in this paper incorporates non-homothetic preferences,
which is especially important for economies transitioning from very low levels of income. The
differential rates of productivity growth is less important in the case of Korea since a faster
productivity growth does not precede structural change. Among other theoretical work, Ace-
moglu and Guerrieri (2008) construct a model of non-balanced growth where sectors differ in
their factor shares. Their model predicts an increase in output, accompanied by a decrease in
the capital and employment in the capital-intensive sector. Buera and Kaboski (2012) build
a model in which high-skilled and specialized labor contributes to the increase in the service
sector. They are able to explain the rapid rise in the service sector observed in the data.
Matsuyama (2009) studies structural change in the context of an open economy and argues
goods are luxury goods. The relative demand for agricultural goods decline as income level rises generating
a structural change away from the agriculture sector.
5See Herrendorf et al. (2014) for a survey of the literature.
6Ngai and Pissarides (2007) formalize the idea first proposed by Baumol (1967). When different types
of goods are complements, an increase in the productivity in the agriculture sector causes a decline in the
price of agricultural goods and moves the economy towards non-agriculture sector.
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for a global view to understand the patterns of structural change in the world economy. He
argues that the global decline in the manufacturing sector can be attributed to productivity
gains in the manufacturing sector but in a cross-section of countries higher productivity in
the manufacturing sector may not be associated with decline in manufacturing.
The paper adds to the expanding literature on quantifying the role of different mecha-
nisms in structural change. Buera and Kaboski (2009) asks whether the traditional theories
of non-homothetic preferences and differential productivity growth can explain the structural
change observed in the US. They first show that a model that incorporates both these forces
cannot generate a balanced growth path and when combined, the two forces are incapable of
explaining the structural change entirely. Specifically, the model fails to capture the rapid
rise in the service sector from 1950 onward. Buera et al. (2011) quantifies the role of finan-
cial friction in the allocation of factors of production between the manufacturing and service
sectors. A number of papers have looked at the role of trade in addition to the traditional
mechanisms. Uy et al. (2013), Sposi (2019), Betts et al. (2017), Teignier (2018) all study the
Korean economy and highlight the importance of openness in the structural change. Other
examples of quantitative studies of the open economy include Coleman (2007), Reyes-Heroles
et al. (2018), Galor and Mountford (2008), Stefanski (2014) and Ungor et al. (2012).
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of capital accumulation during
the growth process. For example, Young (1994) and Young (1995) highlight the role of
increasing investment rates in explaining growth miracles in East Asian countries. The
model in this paper also features a high price of capital during early years of development,
which is consistent with the findings of Caselli and Feyrer (2007). The model in this paper
is able to generate the path of investment rates qualitatively as well as quantitatively.
The paper is organized as follows. I first lay out the model in section 2, define the
competitive equilibrium and discuss the features of the model. In section 3, I calibrate the
model to the Korean economy and in sub-section 3.1, I run counterfactual experiments to
quantify the effects of openness and discuss possible channels to explain the discrepancy
between the open and closed economy. Section 4 concludes.
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2.2 Model
The model is a canonical version of models used to study structural change. There
are two sectors in the model: agriculture and non-agriculture. Agricultural goods are only
used for consumption while the non-agricultural good can be used for consumption and
investment. There is a representative household in the economy that is infinitely lived and
consumes these two goods. The consumption of agricultural good is represented as C1t and
the consumption of non-agricultural good is represented as C2t . The objective of the agent
is to maximize his lifetime utility given by
∞∑
t=0
βtu(C(C1t , C
2
t )). (2.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. The per-period utility function satisfies u′ > 0,
u′′ < 0, limc→0 u′(C) = ∞ and limC→∞ u′(C) = 0. C(C1t , C2t ) is a constant elasticity of
substitution function that aggregates the consumption goods - i.e.
C(C1t , C
2
t ) =
[
θ(C1t − c¯)
−1
 + (1− θ)(C2t )
−1

] 
−1
0 < θ < 1 is the share of agricultural good and  ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between the two consumption goods. Note also that there is a subsistence requirement of
the agricultural good represented by the parameter c¯ ≥ 0. The preference is therefore non-
homothetic and exhibits a non-linear Engel curve. In particular, the relative demand for the
non-agricultural good increase as income increases.
The size of the household is given by Lt, which grows at a constant gross rate gn. The
agent maximizes his lifetime utility subject to the per-period budget constraint,
ptC
1
t + C
2
t + τtIt = RtKt + wtLt (2.2)
The left hand side of the constraint is the expenditure and the right hand side is the
income of the agent. Aggregate capital accumulates according to the law of motion given
by:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt. (2.3)
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The price of non-agricultural good is normalized to one. τt is a distortion to capital
accumulation.
There are two representative firms producing the two goods in the economy. The pro-
duction functions differ in terms of the factors of production they use. The agricultural good
is produced using labor only.
Y 1t = ztL
1
t
The representative agricultural firm solves
max
L1t
ptztL
1
t − wtL1t (2.4)
On the other hand, the non-agricultural good is produced using a constant returns to
scale Cobb-Douglas production function. Unlike the agricultural sector, the non-agricultural
sector uses both capital and labor.
Y 2t = K
α
t (ztL
2
t )
1−α
The firm solves
max
Kt,L2t
Kαt (ztL
2
t )
1−α −RtKt − wtL2t . (2.5)
Note that the labor productivity in both sectors, zt, is the same. I assume that zt grows
at a constant rate gz over time.
The resource constraint for labor is given by
L1t + L
2
t = Lt, (2.6)
where Lt is the total labor supplied by the household.
The resource constraints for the two goods are given by:
C1t = Y
1
t (2.7)
C2t + τtIt = Y
2
t (2.8)
Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is allocations {C1t , C2t , It, Kt, L1t , L2t}∞t=0, prices {pt, wt, Rt}∞t=0
and the distortions {τt}∞t=0, such that
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1. Taking prices as given, the household maximizes its lifetime utility (2.1) subject to the
budget constraint (23).
2. Taking prices as given, the both the firms maximize their profits. I.e. they solve problems
(2.4) and (2.5).
3. Markets clear for labor, capital and outputs. I.e. equations (2.6) - (2.8) hold and capital
supplied by the household equals capital demanded by the firm in the non-agricultural
sector.
2.2.1 Discussion
In generating structural change, the two major forces discussed in the literature are de-
clining income elasticity of agricultural goods and differential sectoral productivity growths,
known as the Engel effect and Baumol effect respectively. These are primarily incorporated
in growth models by introducing a subsistence parameter for the agricultural good and differ-
ing productivity growth rates across sectors. But as discussed in Buera and Kaboski (2009),
including both these channels in a growth model is inconsistent with a balanced growth path
at any time. If sectoral productivities grow at the same rate and relative prices are constant,
balanced growth requires c¯ = 0. And if c¯ = 0 but sectoral productivities grow at different
rates, a balanced growth path requires elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods to
be less than one and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution equal to one, specifically,
u(c) = log(c) and  < 1. Since c¯ > 0 is a crucial assumption, there is no hope of getting a
balanced growth path in the current model. Instead, I resort to a model that converges to
a balanced growth path asysmptotically. Since intertemporal elasticity of substitution can
play an important role, I use a general CRRA function. But this precludes letting prices
change over time in the long-run.
With a CRRA utility function of the form
u(C) =
C1−σ
1− σ ,
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the first order conditions that characterize the solution of the model is given by:
C2t =
(
C1t − c¯
)(
1− θ
θ
pt
)
(
C2t+1
C2t
)σ
= β
g(pt)
g(pt+1)
[
α
τt
Kα−1t+1 (zt+1L
2
t+1)
1−α +
τt+1
τt
(1− δ)
]
pt = (1− α)Kαt (ztL2t )−α
C2t + τtKt+1 = K
α
t (ztL
2
t )
1−α + τt(1− δ)Kt
C1t = ztL
1
t
L1t + L
2
t = Lt
where
g(pt) =
[
θ
(
θ
1− θ
1
pt
)−1
+ 1− θ
] σ−1
−1
(2.9)
From equating the marginal product of labor across sectors, we find the labor allocated
to the non-agricultural sector:
L2t = (1− α)1−α
Kt
ztp
1
α
t
(2.10)
The labor share in the non-agricultural share goes up when capital goes up. This is
intuitive because an increase in the level of capital increases the marginal product of labor
in the non-agricultural sector, so there is a movement of labor into this sector. On the other
hand, when agricultural price goes up, there is a higher demand for labor by the firm in the
agricultural sector and labor moves out of the non-agricultural sector.
The value-added share of the agricultural sector, V A, is given by:7
V A =
1− α
1− α + L2t
L1t
(2.11)
The value-added share has a one-to-one relation with the ratio of the labor shares. Specif-
ically, the value added shares decreases when the employment shares in the non-agricultural
7Check Appendix B for derivation.
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sector relative to the agricultural sector increases. Therefore, the distortion in the price
of investment affects the value added shares in the agricultural (and therefore the non-
agricultural) sector to the extent it affects the reallocation of labor from the agricultural to
the non-agricultural sector and vice-versa.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
Calibration
The model is solved numerically. There are several preference and technology parameters
along with the sequence for distortions {τt} that need to be calibrated.
We take data from the Korean economy focusing particularly between the period 1970-
2005. A period in the model corresponds to a year in the data. Table (7) lists the parameters
and their values taken directly from the literature.
β 0.97
σ 2.0
α 0.33
δ 0.06
gn 1.01
Table 7: Pre-determined parameters
The values for {β, σ, α, δ} are all standard. The value for gn is the growth rate of
population, which equals 1.011 and the initial population is normalized to one. The data is
available in the Penn-World Table 7.1.8
The remaining parameters are {c¯, θ, , z0, gz, k0}. These parameters are jointly calibrated
to minimize the sum of the square of the difference between the output per capita, employ-
ment shares in the agricultural sector and relative price of agricultural goods in the model
and the data. The data come from a few different sources. Output per capita is available
8Check http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site/pwt index.php.
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from the World Bank Indicators. The employment shares are taken from the World Bank.
The relative price of agricultural goods is constructed using the data from OECD.9 The
parameter values are presented in table (8).
c¯ 0.49
θ 0.15
 1.55
z0 1.09
gz 1.05
k0 0.97
Table 8: Calibrated parameters
The parameter  is an important parameter in the literature. In a Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) environment  < 1 is required to generate a balanced growth path. This restriction
is crucial when the relative price of sectoral goods are growing as well. In our model, the
relative price changes in the short-run but asymptotically remains unchanged, and hence the
restriction is not important for the asymptotic balanced growth path.
It remains to find the sequence {τt}. These distortions are inferred from the data on
relative price of investment good. Figure (16) shows the price of the investment good and
a second degree polynomial that approximates the price. This second-degree polynomial
approximation is fed into the model for the period 1970-2005. For the remaining periods the
price is fixed at the level of 2005.
9Check https://stats.oecd.org/.
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Figure 16: Relative price of investment
To infer the sequence of distortions, we equate the relative price of investment in the
model to the data. I.e.
τt
Pt
= χt (2.12)
where χt is the relative price of investment in the data and Pt is the composite price of
consumption good given by
Pt =
[
θ(pt)
1− + (1− θ)] 11−
The values of {τt} is given in figure (17).
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Figure 17: Values of τt
To see how the model performs, we begin by comparing output per capita from the model
and the data. As can be seen in figure (18) the model is able to mimic output per capita
well. Similarly, figure (20) compares employment shares in the agricultural sector from the
model and the data.
Figure 18: Output per capita
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Figure 19: Employment shares of agriculture
Figure 20: Value-added shares of agriculture
While untargeted, there is a close relationship between the employment share and the
value-added share. Figure (20) shows how the model does in capturing the value-added
shares. The value-added shares are taken from the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics
System (ECOS).10 Like the employment shares, the model is able to predict the decrease in
value-added shares in the agricultural sector. However, the model over-predicts the value-
added shares quantitatively.
10Check https://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex en.jsp. The ECOS provides data on GDP by kind of economic
activity in current prices as well as base year prices in Korean Won.
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The increasing and high investment rate in the Korean economy during the second half
of the twentieth century are well-documented facts. (e.g. Young (1994), Young (1995))
The model is able to produce this pattern for investment rate quite well. As noted by Cai
et al. (2015) a one-sector model produces a U-shaped pattern for investment rate, which is
inconsistent with what is observed in the data.
Figure 21: Investment rate
2.3.1 Counterfactuals
To understand how the reforms affected the economy, I now consider a counterfactual
experiment in which the values of distortion τ is kept at the 1970 level. This is the pre-reform
version of the economy. The initial conditions in the models are the same as in the previous
economy.
Value-added and Employment Shares of Agriculture
In order to compare the value-added and employment shares of agriculture, I compute
the ratios of these variables in the pre-reform economy relative to that in the post-reform
economy. Table (9) lists these ratios by decade. The first thing to notice is that there is hardly
any difference in the shares in the first decade. However, the ratios start to increase in the
longer horizon. In 2005, the value-added share in the pre-reform economy is 7% higher than
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that in the post-reform economy. Similarly, the employment share in agriculture is also 7%
higher in the pre-reform economy relative to the post-reform economy. To put it in context,
the employment share in the post-reform economy is 11.4% in 2005, so when employment
share is 7% higher in the pre-reform economy, around 300,000 more are employed in the
agricultural sector.11 Both employment and value-added shares in the pre-reform economy
stabilizes around 10% higher than those in the post-reform economy in the long-run.
Year Employment shares (Pre/Post) Value-added shares (Pre/Post)
1970 1.00 1.00
1980 1.01 1.01
1990 1.02 1.02
2000 1.05 1.06
2005 1.07 1.08
2020 1.10 1.11
Table 9: Value-added shares and employment shares in agriculture
To understand why the employment shares in the pre-reform economy is higher than in
the post-reform economy, consider the expression for employment shares given by equation
(2.10). The difference in employment shares depend on how the relative price of agriculture
and the level of capital behave under the two regimes. These are shown in figure (22). In
both cases, there is a rise in the level of capital and agricultural price after the first decade.
The post-reform economy exhibits higher levels for both these variables. A higher level of
capital draws higher levels of labor as well. At the same time, while higher agricultural prices
puts downward pressure on the non-agricultural labor, because  > 1 and the two goods are
substitutes, there is a substitution away from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector
causing a reallocation of labor into the non-agricultural sector.12
11This number is computed by multiplying 0.07 by the working age population in the economy employed
in the agricultural sector.
12I consider values of  < 1, in which case the results are the opposite. Value-added and employment
shares in the agricultural shares are higher in the post-reform economy relative to the pre-reform economy.
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(a) Capital (b) Price of agricultural good.
Figure 22: Capital and price of agricultural goods in open and closed economies
Output
A similar exercise comparing two regimes shows that output per capita is lower under the
pre-reform economy compared to the post-reform economy. Increased investment in capital
and increase in employment in the agricultural sector both cause output to increase. As seen
in table 10, output per capita under the pre-reform economy is 17% lower in the pre-reform
economy relative to the post-reform economy in 2005. In the long-run, output per capita is
20% lower in the pre-reform economy.
Year GDP per capita (Pre/Post)
1970 0.99
1980 0.99
1990 0.92
2000 0.85
2005 0.82
2020 0.79
Table 10: GDP per capita
Investment Rate
Table (11) compares investment rates in the two economies. Investment rate is generally
higher in the pre-reform economy, especially in the early years. Firstly, this is due to the
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higher price of investment in the pre-reform economy. Secondly, when investment price
decreases in the post-reform economy, households temporarily increase their consumption of
the non-agricultural good, and decrease their savings. However, over time, investment rates
catch up with the pre-reform economy once households start to increase their savings.
Year Investment Rate (Pre/Post)
1970 1.11
1980 1.06
1990 1.04
2000 1.00
2005 0.99
2020 0.99
Table 11: Investment rates
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effects of decline in investment prices, brought about by economic
reforms, on the process of structural change and economic growth. Economic reforms are
represented by the level of distortion present in investment of capital. Using the Korean
economy to calibrate a two sector model, the paper compares an economy in which reforms
take place with one where they don’t. I find that the reforms have implications for sectoral
value-added and employment shares, output levels and investment rates in the economy. In
particular, the post-reform economy generates a higher level of output and higher employ-
ment and value-added shares in the non-agricultural sector. The investment levels decrease
in the short-run in the post-reform economy but accelerate quickly thereafter.
This research can be extended by incorporating difference in productivity across sectors.
For example, the change in sectoral productivity can have implications for the structural
change in the economy. A balanced growth path would cease to exist if this channel was
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incorporated in the current model. But comparing the outcomes of this model to one where
there is productivity growth differentials can potentially provide further insights.
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3.0 Estimating the Tax Elasticity of Taxable Income Using the CPS
3.1 Introduction
Understanding behavioral responses to changes in tax policies is one of the central goals
in economics. Since tax change is an important policy tool for policymakers, the interest
in understanding such responses extends beyond academics. Much of the previous work in
this area, summarized in a survey study by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), focused on the
responses of labor supply and savings behavior. The general consensus is that the elasticity of
male labor supply is very low and labor force participation for married women is significant.
On the other hand, there isn’t a strong consensus on the response of savings. Starting from
Lindsey (1987), in an effort to capture the effect of taxation on a wide range of behavioral
responses, the focus has shifted from the elasticity of labor supply to elasticity of taxable
income. In principle, taxable income captures a variety of responses including labor hours,
tax evasion, effort and so on and is perhaps a better measure of response to tax changes.
The fact that previous work have found sizable effects of taxation on taxable income also
suggests that more studies need to be done to check the robustness and reliability of the
estimates.
In this paper, I use the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA), Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) and the
American Tax Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) to determine the elasticity of taxable income
(ETI). Endogeneity is a major concern in estimating the elasticity of taxable income. We
are interested in the change in taxable income but with graduated tax structure, an increase
in income also implies a higher tax rate. Using the tax reform helps in this regard as we
can use an instrumental variables approach. The tax reforms considered here applied to
individuals across the board. Therefore, it is feasible to study household behavior for those
with lower income as well. The data is taken from the Current Population Survey (IPUMS-
CPS). Although the CPS is generally used as a source for cross-sectional observations of
individuals, I use its panel structure in the analysis. Unlike the tax return data commonly
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used in estimating the elasticity parameter, the CPS has several demographic information
one can control for.1
I find an ETI of 0.65 for married couples, which is within the range of estimates found in
the literature. For singles, I find an ETI of 0.2 but the estimate is not statistically significant.
Related Literature
As mentioned previously, measuring elasticity to policy variables is important in eco-
nomics. These estimates are helpful in prescribing policy changes as well as building eco-
nomic models to derive predictions in a variety of contexts. It is therefore unsurprising
that a number of studies have tried to estimate the elasticity of income. However, getting
a robust estimate is far from simple. We encounter various issues related to endogeneity.
Different methodologies have been suggested in the literature to address these issues, and
several values for the elasticity have been proposed ranging from −1.3 to as high as 3.05
(Goolsbee et al. (1999), Feldstein (1995)). I discuss some of the previous work done and
caveats below.
In studying the effects of tax rate on income, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) analyze
aggregated data. They study how income share of the top 0.5 percent evolved before 1990
and argue that the time-series demonstrates behavioral response to the declining marginal
tax rate for that group. Saez et al. (2012) does a simple calculation where they compute
the change in the share of income of the top 1 percent when there was a change in the
net-of-tax rate. The estimate varied from −0.39 to 1.36 depending on which tax reform they
were looking at. They also estimate the elasticity by regressing income share on net-of-tax
rate across different reforms, which yields a value of 1.71. This is done without accounting
for factors contributing to the changing inequality. Adding a time trend and other controls
brings the elasticity to a much smaller number.
Some studies have also used repeated-cross-section data. For example, Lindsey (1987),
which was the first paper to study the response of income to tax reform, uses repeated cross-
section tax return data. He exploits the Economic Reform Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), which
reduced tax rates significantly for the high income earners. He computed the distribution of
1e.g. Feldstein (1995), Saez (2003) use the NBER tax panel, Auten and Carroll (1999), Sammartino and
Weiner (1997), Auten and Carroll (1993) use treasury tax panel, Goolsbee et al. (1999) uses tax statistics
tables
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income that would be expected in the absence of tax changes and attributed the difference
in actual tax return data to the response of taxpayers. He restricts the data to those with
adjusted gross income (AGI) of more than $5,000 and estimates the elasticity of taxable
income in the range of 1.053 to 2.750. Like Lindsey, Goolsbee et al. (1999) uses repeated
cross-sectional data to estimate the ETI from tax changes between 1920 and 1966. In
their paper, they find ETI ranging from -1.3 to 2. They consider those with income higher
than $30,000. Studies that use repeated-cross-section data usually employ a difference-in-
differences approach, where they divide the data into groups of income. E.g. the top 1
percent and the next 9 percent in the distribution. The fact that the trends for these two
income groups are not parallel implies that an unbiased estimate is not guaranteed.
Feldstein (1995) was the first paper to use panel data to investigate the ETI. He used
panel data from the Treasury department for around 4000 taxpayers to estimate the ETI
based on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), which saw a large decline in the tax rates for
high-income earners. Restricting the sample to married individual with income higher than
$30,000, he divides the sample into groups based on the 1985 marginal tax rates and compares
them to one another in a difference-in-differences approach to obtain large values for ETI
ranging from 1.1 to 3.05. This seminal paper was instrumental in popularizing the use of
panel data. Following Feldstein (1995) several studies exploiting different reforms and panel
data have been carried out. For example, Auten and Carroll (1999) use the Treasury Tax
Panel to study the TRA and produce an elasticity of taxable income of 0.75 for those with
income level higher than $15, 000. They also address issues like mean reversion, endogeneity
and income trends in their instrumental variables approach. Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998)
use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the TRA as well and provide an estimate
ranging from 0 to 2. In addition to estimating the elasticity of income with respect to
marginal tax rates, they also study labor supply, which they find does not change alongside
income. Both Auten and Carroll (1999) and Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) provide estimates
by estimating the elasticity over two years of data. Gruber and Saez (2002) use the NBER
panel of tax returns over the period 1979-1990 and use a framework to decompose the effect
of taxation into income and substitution effects. Their long panel allows them to control for
time trends more effectively. They provide an estimate of 0.4 for those with income higher
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than $10, 000.
Other studies have looked at the income response of tax changes in countries other than
the US. For example, Blow and Preston (2002) focus on the UK, Kleven and Schultz (2014)
estimates the ETI using the Danish data, Sillamaa and Veall (2001) computes the ETI for
Canada and so on.
3.2 Reforms
The data from CPS makes it possible to study any tax reform after 1992. As such, I
consider the three major policy changes related to taxation: Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA).
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), collectively known as the ”Bush
tax cuts”, were signed into law in June 2001 and May 2003 respectively. JGTRRA was
implemented retroactively and the tax relief was applied to all income from the beginning
of 2003. The two reforms were introduced with the aim of promoting growth by creating
incentives to work and invest. Among other things, the main feature of the tax reform was
a decrease in the marginal tax rates on income across the board. EGTRRA was initially
conceived as a tax reform to be phased in over a period of multiple years and scheduled to
expire in 2010. However, due to a sluggish economy, the tax reform was accelerated by the
JGTRRA and many of the tax cuts were implemented ahead of the plan. The tax reform saw
the marginal tax rates go from (15%,28%,31%,36%,39.6%) to (10%,15%,25%,28%,33%,35%).
Tables 4-9 show how the marginal income tax rates and tax brackets changed over the reform
period. On the corporate side, the JGTRRA also reduced taxation on dividends and capital
gains.2
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) was signed into law in January 2013
2The aim of JGTRRA was to bring investment and spur growth but as Chetty and Saez (2005) argue, it
ended up increasing dividend payments to shareholders instead. Yagan (2015) also argues that the tax cuts
did not increase investment as was intended.
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amidst a recovering economy and call for more redistribution to address the inequality in
the nation. Among other features of the reform, this reform also included changes to the
marginal income tax rate. But unlike the previous two reforms, only those in the top income
bracket saw their tax rate increase from 35% to the pre-EGTRRA tax rate of 39.6%.
3.3 Data
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1992 to 2013. CPS is a monthly
survey that collects extensive data on labor market characteristics. Unlike other data sources
that study tax policies, it also has rich information on demographics including age, sex, ed-
ucation, marital status, race and so on. In particular, I use the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement of the CPS. This supplementary survey, which is conducted in March of every
year collects information on income (from multiple sources) among other things. Based on
the information provided by the interviewee, CPS-IPUMS also provides information on taxes
for the individual.
The survey is conducted in a 4-8-4 system, where an individual is interviewed for four
consecutive months and discontinued for the next eight months. After the eight months, the
same individual is interviewed for the next four months before he/she exits the survey. This
survey design allows us a way to link an individual across time and create a panel structure.3
For our purposes, the panel structure is necessary as we compare tax and income across
years.
CPS-IPUMS only allows us to link an individual across a maximum of two years. The
strategy is to look at the difference in incomes as a function of change in marginal tax rates.
Mean reversion is identified as a problem in the literature. While I use income in the first
year as a control to alleviate this problem, following Gruber and Saez (2002) I also restrict
the data to exclude individuals (or households for married) with income less than $10, 000
to avoid extreme mean reversion.
The income measure used in the study is taxable income. CPS has data on taxable income
3See Rivera Drew et al. (2014) for details on linking individuals.
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only for those with taxable income less than $100,000 for years prior to 2011. However, data
is available for those with income more than $100,000 after 2011, which allows us to exploit
ATRA because only those with the highest marginal tax rate were affected. Also, for those
who were married and filed their taxes jointly, only one value for taxable income is available.
So I carry out the study for individuals and married separately. For the married, any change
in income should be seen as change in cumulative income. The intrahousehold allocation of
work hours or income is not considered here, although this would be an interesting topic to
look at. Tables (12) and (13) provide some summary statistics on the data.
Mean age (men) 45
Mean age (women) 43
Fraction of men in labor force 0.89
Fraction of women in labor force 0.73
Fraction both (huband and wife) in labor force 0.67
Fraction with children 0.64
Mean number of children (# of child > 0) 2
Fraction self-employed (men) 0.14
Fraction self-employed (women) 0.07
Fraction both self-employed 0.03
Fraction of men with college degree 0.31
Fraction of women with college degree 0.32
Fraction both with college degree 0.20
Mean taxable income $59,870
S.D. of taxable income $68,294
Mean net of tax rate 0.81
N 15,200
Table 12: Summary statistics for married couples. Source: Current Population Survey
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Mean age 43
Fraction men 0.50
Fraction in labor force 0.83
Fraction self-employed 0.06
Fraction with college degree 0.29
Mean taxable income $25,522
S.D. of taxable income $37,699
Mean net of tax rate 0.84
N 15,709
Table 13: Summary statistics for singles. Source: Current Population Survey
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Conceptual Framework
In order to derive the regression equation, I use a model following Gruber and Saez
(2002). A household derives utility from consumption, c and income z. Here, income is
used to broadly capture labor hours, unobserved effort etc. that determine income. Since
it’s natural to think that activities that increase income are costly, higher levels of income
decreases the agent’s utility. The agent faces the budget constraint
c = z − T (z) ≡ (1− τ)z + y,
where y is “virtual” income. Virtual income is the amount of non-labor income when z = 0.
As figure (23) shows, in an economy with progressive taxation, where marginal rates are
non-decreasing, the budget line is non-linear.4 It can also be seen in the figure that if there
is a tax reform that changes the marginal tax rate for income above z∗, this changes both
the slope of the after tax income as well as the virtual income.
4See Hausman (1985) for this concept.
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Figure 23: Tax reforms and budget constraints
The agent therefore solves
max
c,z
u(c, z) subject to c = (1− τ)z + y
This maximization yields an income z, as a function of the net of tax rate 1 − τ and
income y, z = z(1− τ, y). A change in the tax rate dτ and income dy produces the following
change in income,
dz = − ∂z
∂(1− τ)dτ +
∂z
∂y
dy (3.1)
Let µu = (1−τ
z
)( ∂z
∂(1−τ)) be the uncompensated elasticity of income with respect to 1− τ
and let ξ = (1− τ)∂z
∂y
be the income effect. After some algebra, we can write (3.1) as
dz = −µuz dτ
1− τ + ξ
dR
1− τ . (3.2)
If µc is the compensated elasticity of income with respect to 1− τ , we have µc = µu− ξ.
Using this relationship in (3.2), we get
dz
z
= −µc dτ
1− τ + ξ
dR− zdτ
z(1− τ) . (3.3)
Now we write equation (3.3) as regression model. The data is a two year panel and we
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call the two years year 1 and year 2.5 We assign the value of year 1 income to z. dz is the
change in income and equals z2−z1. dτ is the change in marginal tax rate, τ2− τ1. dR−zdτ
is the change in after tax income and can be written as (z2 − T2(z2))− (z1 − T1(z1)).
As is common in the literature, using a log-log specification, from (3) we get to the
regression equation,
log(z2)− log(z1) = µ[log(1−τ2)− log(1−τ1)]+ξ[log(z2−T2(z2))− log(z1−T1(z1))]+ (3.4)
3.4.2 Discussion
Equation (3.4) in its current form cannot be used to estimate the elasticity parameter.
Notice that while taxable income depends on the marginal tax rates, the tax rates itself
depend on the level of income. In particular, if there is a rise in the level of income for
an individual for any reason other than the tax rate, this will cause the net-of-tax rate to
go down. Similarly, if there is a decline in income, this will cause the net-of-tax rate to
increase. Due to this endogeneity, OLS estimates will be biased downwards. To fix this, we
can use an instrumental variables approach. A natural way to construct an instrument is to
compute the predicted marginal tax rate, τ2(z1), by using the income in year 1, i.e., given a
household’s income in the first year, what is their marginal tax rate after the reform? We
can then use log(1 − τ2(z1)) − log(1 − τ1(z1)) as an instrument for the first regressor and
log(z1 − T2(z1))− log(z1 − T1(z1)) as an instrument for the second regressor.
Mean reversion is another issue that can bias the elasticity estimate. Households that
report low levels of income in the first year due to an income shock or misreporting typically
have higher levels of income the next year. One way to mitigate this problem is to control
for the log of income from the first year. Then, any bias due to mean reversion is reduced by
adding this term. Log of income is also a way to control for the effects of changing income
inequality. If income distribution is changing over time for some reason, there is a positive
correlation between the shocks  and income. So controlling for income in the first period
5In many of the other papers that look at the elasticity of income, they look at a difference of three years.
Since it is possible that behavioral changes as a response to policy changes can take a longer time period,
it would be desirable to have a panel covering several years. This is perhaps a drawback of using the CPS,
which covers a maximum of two years.
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could also help resolve this issue. However, this is more of a problem when studying income
changes over longer periods of time. It is less severe here because we only have a one year
window to consider.
As described above, the CPS provides joint income for married couples and individual
income for singles. I study these two groups separately below.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Singles
I first present the results for singles. I present the OLS and IV estimates in table (14).
In the IV regression, I use just the instrument on the net-of-tax rate because the F-statistics
for the instrument on income effect is less than 5. On the other hand, the F-statistic for
the coefficient of net-of-tax rate instrument is higher than 20. As discussed above, the OLS
estimate is biased downward.
Dependent variable: log
(
z2
z1
)
Variable OLS IV
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
−0.148∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.240
(0.530)
0.075
(0.519)
0.054
(0.516)
log(z1) 0.001
∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.047∗∗∗
(0.016)
−0.514∗∗∗
(0.016)
−0.512∗∗∗
(0.016)
College 0.325∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.326∗∗∗
(0.019)
Self-employed −0.118∗∗∗
(0.037)
constant −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
4.65∗∗∗
(0.14)
4.933∗∗∗
(0.143)
4.923∗∗∗
(0.142)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,706 10,665 10,665 10,665
R2 0.24 0.24
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 14: Results for singles
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The regression for singles result in a coefficient of 0.24, which is within the range of
estimates found in the literature. However, the estimate is not statistically significant. This
could be because majority of the individuals are those with income less than $100, 000, for
whom previous studies have found a smaller and less significant coefficient as well.
3.5.2 Married Households
Like in the case of the singles, the regression in the first stage has an F-statistic larger
than 20 for the coefficient of the instrument on the tax rate, but the F-statistic for the
coefficient of the instrument on the income effect is much smaller around 3. As such, I run
the analysis with just the change in net-of-tax rate as the regressor. Gruber and Saez (2002)
also find a small F-statistic for the coefficient on the instrument of income effect and run
their baseline analysis without the income effect. They also argue that while income effect
may be present it is usually small in magnitude.6
The main result of the regression is shown in table (15). The baseline regression con-
trolling for just the year effects and initial income yields an estimate of 0.65. When more
controls are added to the regression, the estimate rises to 0.69. The dependent variable in
the regression is the total taxable income of a married couple. The result suggests that there
is behavioral response to tax changes. One possible channel is through changes in the labor
supply. However, the regression of labor supply on net-of-tax rate results in statistically
insignificant estimates.
6Other studies like Auten and Carroll (1999) start with a model without the income effect.
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Dependent variable: log
(
z2
z1
)
Variable OLS IV
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
−0.260∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.650∗∗
(0.32)
0.650∗∗
(0.32)
0.690∗∗
(0.32)
0.690∗∗
(0.32)
log(z1) −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0002)
−0.450∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.450∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.510∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.510∗∗∗
(0.014)
Self-employed husband 0.320
(0.21)
0.016
(0.02)
0.015
(0.02)
Self-employed wife 0.009
(0.020)
0.005
(0.020)
0.005
(0.020)
College educated husband 0.196∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.019∗∗∗
(0.017)
College educated wife 0.169∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.170∗∗∗
(0.017)
Child −0.030∗∗
(0.014)
constant −0.220∗∗∗
(0.002)
4.60∗∗∗
(0.135)
4.590
(0.13)
5.120∗∗∗
(0.140)
0.140
(5.160)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,003 13,003 13,003 13,003 13,003
R2 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.17
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 15: Results for married couples
In order to understand why there is a change in taxable income when tax rates change,
one variable we could look at is hours worked. In table (16) I regress the change in log
of hours between year one and two on the change in log of net of tax rates. Once again,
the OLS estimate is biased but unlike with income, we cannot construct instruments to
get unbiased estimates. Similar to the OLS estimate with income, the estimates for the
correlation between the two variables are negative.
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Dependent variable: log
(
h2
h1
)
Variable
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
−0.059∗∗
(0.023)
−0.030
(0.025)
log(z1) −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
constant −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.088∗∗∗
(0.030)
Year fixed effects No Yes
N 5,711 5,711
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 16: Correlation between change in hours worked and change in net of tax rates
By College Education
I now divide the sample into three types of married couples based on both their education
levels:
(i) Neither have a college degree
Dependent variable: log
(
z2
z1
)
Variable IV
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
1.040∗∗∗
(0.420)
log(z1) −0.520∗∗∗
(0.017)
constant 5.240
(0.180)
Year fixed effects Yes
N 6,952
R2 0.16
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 17: Results when neither spouse has a college degree
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(ii) Exactly one spouse has a college degree
Dependent variable: log
(
z2
z1
)
Variable IV
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
0.900
(0.680)
log(z1) −0.550∗∗∗
(0.035)
constant 5.690
(0.360)
Year fixed effects Yes
N 3,093
R2 0.15
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 18: Results when exactly one spouse has a college degree
(iii) Both spouses have college degrees
Dependent variable: log
(
z2
z1
)
Variable IV
log
(
1− τ2
1− τ1
)
0.480
(0.750)
log(z1) −0.520∗∗∗
(0.037)
constant 5.460
(0.390)
Year fixed effects Yes
N 2,958
R2 0.18
*** significant at the 1 % level ** significant at the 5 % level * significant at the 10 % level
Table 19: Results when exactly one spouse has a college degree
The results suggest that those who do not have college degrees responded more to the
tax changes most strongly. The next interesting step will be figure out the exact behavioral
responses that brings about the change in income.
Discussion
A few caveats are in order. Like in other studies, the analysis here is limited by data
availability. When using the CPS, data is only available for two consecutive years but the
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effect of taxation could take place over multiple years. Without a longer panel, we cannot
guarantee that the behavioral change in the two years completely capture the effects of tax
change. In their baseline analysis, Gruber and Saez (2002) conduct the same analysis with
a three year window but also consider two and three year windows. They find the results
to be similar in all cases. Another caveat in the analysis here is that people of every income
level is assumed to have the same elasticity, but this may not be the case. In particular,
those with higher incomes are generally found to be more sensitive to tax changes.
Saez et al. (2012) also allude to a few issues in using panel data. While income in the
base year is used to control for mean reversion it is not clear whether it controls for mean
reversion or changes in income inequality. This is even more concerning given that controlling
for income can absorb variation in the tax rates, which tend to be correlated with income.
As a result, some information can be lost. Also, using panel data is informative when income
levels are persistent over years but it is found that there is a non-negligible fraction of people
whose income changes dramatically. This is worsened when income changes across multiple
years are considered. These concerns and the fact that results using the panel data are
found to be very sensitive to specifications, Saez et al. (2012) argue that in some cases using
repeated cross-sectional data is more appropriate.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Estimating the elasticity of income is of central importance in economics. In this paper
I use the panel structure of the CPS to estimate this elasticity parameter. The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) and the American Tax Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA)
provide an opportunity to employ an instrumental variables approach to estimate the elas-
ticity of taxable income with respect to taxation. I find that the elasticity of taxable income
is around 0.65 for married couples. Much of this comes from couples who do not have college
degrees.
64
Appendix A
Chapter 1
(i) Repayment under different repayment plans - an example
Suppose an individual earns $30, 000 a year and has loaned out $30,000. The following
diagram shows the fraction of the principal remaining over time.
Figure 24: Fraction of principal
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(ii) Entrepreneurs by occupation and industry
The tables below show the fraction of entrepreneurs by industry and occupation.
Occupation College No college
Managerial and Professional Specialty 66.11% 16.4%
Technical, Sales and Administration 22.06% 27.5%
Service Occupation 6.09% 21.1%
Precision Production, Craft and Repair 2.4% 13.9%
Operators, Fabricators and Laborers 2.3% 17.2%
Farming, Forestry and Fishing 0.09% 3.7%
Table 20: Entrepreneurs by occupation. Source: Current Population Survey
Industry College No college
Professional and Related Services 44.8% 20.0%
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 9.2% 5.1%
Retail Trade 8.2% 19.2%
Manufacturing 8.1% 11.9%
Business and Repair Services 7.9% 7.5%
Public Administration 6.9% 4.1%
Transportation, Communications and Other Public Utilities 4.7% 8.3%
Construction 2.6% 10.2%
Wholesale Trade 2.1% 2.6%
Professional Services 2.0% 4.3%
Entertainment and Recreation Services 1.4% 1.8%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 1.3% 3.6%
Mining 0.05% 1.1%
Table 21: Entrepreneurs by industry. Source: Current Population Survey
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(iii) Computational algorithm:
a. Guess a value for tax rate τ guess.
b. Guess a value for interest rate rguess. Using the corporate production function,
compute wage rates.
wu = (1− α)
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
c. Use backward induction to solve for agents’ value functions and policy functions.
d. Using the policy functions, compute the distribution over the state variables.
e. Using the distribution and policy functions, compute the total asset saved by the
agents. Also, compute the capital used by the entrepreneurs. Using the market
clearing condition for capital, we get the capital used by the corporate sector, K.
f. Using the occupational choices of agents and the distribution over the state variables
compute total human capital supplied, H.
g. Using K and H from the previous two steps, find the value of r using
rupdated = αKα−1H1−α − δ
h. If |rupdated − rguess| < , where  is a small number, proceed to step 10.
i. If rupdated > rguess increase the value of rguess and repeat steps 2 - 8. If rupdated < rguess
decrease the value of rguess and repeat steps 2 - 8.
j. If government expenditure is close to government revenue, the model is solved. Oth-
erwise, if government expenditure is bigger than revenue increase τ guess and repeat
steps 1 - 10 and if government expenditure is lower than revenue decrease τ guess and
repeat steps 1 - 10.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2
(i) Deriving the value added share of agriculture given by (2.11):
One of the first order conditions equates the marginal product of labor across sectors.
I.e.
pt = (1− α)Kαt (ztL2t )−α
Now,
V A =
pztL
1
t
pztL1t +K
α
t (ztL
2
t )
1−α
=
1
1 +
Kαt (ztL
2
t )
1−α
pztL1t
(B.1)
Plug in the term for pt and focus just on the right term in the denominator. The right
term is given by:
Kαt (ztL
2
t )
1−α
ptztL1t
=
Kαt (ztL
2
t )
1−α
(1− α)Kαt (ztL2t )−αztL1t
=
L2t
(1− α)L1t
Plug this expression in (B.1) and we get equation (2.11)
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(ii) Algorithm for solving the transition dynamics:
Begin by normalizing and re-defining the variables in the following way:
cˆ2t =
c2t
ztLt
, kˆt =
Kt
ztLt
, cˆ1t =
c1t
ztLt
, n1t =
L1t
Lt
The first order conditions can be rewritten in terms of normalized variables:(
cˆ2t+1
cˆ2t
)σ
= β
g(pt)
g(pt+1)
(
α
τt
kˆα−1t+1 (1− n1t+1)1−α +
τt+1
τt
(1− δ)
)
(B.2)
cˆ2t + τtkˆt+1 = kˆ
α
t (1− n1t )1−α + τt(1− δ)kˆt (B.3)
cˆ2t =
(
n1t −
c¯
ztLt
)(
1− θ
θ
pt
)
(B.4)
pt = (1− α)kˆαt (1− n1t )−α (B.5)
Again, g(pt) is given by (2.9).
I employ a shooting algorithm targeting the steady state value of kˆt to solve for the time
series of the endogenous variables. The algorithm is as follows:
(1) For given kˆ0, guess a value for cˆ0.
(2) Using (B.4) and (B.5), we can find the values for n10 and p0.
(3) With {kˆ0, cˆ0, n10, p0}, solve the system of four equations - (B.2), (B.3). and period 1
versions of (B.4) and (B.5). This step yields {kˆ1, cˆ1, n11, p1}.1
(4) With values for {kˆt, cˆt, n1t , pt}, repeat step 3 to obtain {kˆt+1, cˆt+1, n1t+1, pt+1}.
(5) Repeat step 4 until t = T , where T is a large number.
(6) Compare kˆT to the steady state value of kˆt = kˆss. Note that for a large enough value
of T , the fraction
c¯
zTLT
→ 0.
(7) If |kT − kˆss| < 0.0001, stop. Otherwise, if kT > kˆss, increase the value of the guess
cˆ0 or if |kT < kˆss|, decrease the value of cˆ0 and repeat steps (2) - (7).
1A non-linear solver is required. I use fsolve in MATLAB.
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(iii) Constructing the series for the price of agricultural goods:
Following the procedure in Uy et al. (2013), I collect data on final consumption expendi-
tures for two broad group of sectors from the OECD national accounts data. Agricultural
sector is defined as the food and non-alcoholic beverages and alcoholic beverages, tobacco
and narcotics. Non-agricultural goods is the sum of durable goods, non-durable goods,
semi-durable goods and services. Data is available for both current and 2010 prices in
local currency. Let Cit be the consumption expenditure in current prices, and let c
i
t be
the consumption expenditure in 2010 prices for sector i in time t. The price of each
sector pkt is given by
pkt =
Cit
cit
pppt
ppp2010
pppt is the purchasing power parity at time t to convert the sectoral prices in US dollars.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3
Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
15.0% 0 43,850 15.0% 0 26,250
28.0% 43,850 105,950 28.0% 26,250 63,550
31.0% 105,950 161,450 31.0% 63,550 132,600
36.0% 161,450 288,350 36.0% 132,600 288,350
39.6% 288,350 - 39.6% 288,350 -
Table 22: Marginal tax rates, 2000
Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
15.0% 0 45,200 15.0% 0 27,050
27.5% 45,200 109,250 27.5% 27,050 65,550
30.5% 109,250 166,500 30.5% 65,550 136,750
35.5% 166,500 297,350 35.5% 136,750 297,350
39.1% 297,350 - 39.1% 297,350 -
Table 23: Marginal tax rates, 2001
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Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
10.0% 0 12,000 10.0% 0 6,000
15.0% 12,000 46,700 15.0% 6,000 27,950
27.0% 46,700 112,850 27.0% 27,950 67,700
30.0% 112,850 171,950 30.0% 67,700 141,250
35.0% 171,950 307,050 35.0% 141,250 307,050
38.6% 307,050 - 38.6% 307,050 -
Table 24: Marginal tax rates, 2002
Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
10.0% 0 14,000 10.0% 0 7,000
15.0% 14,000 56,800 15.0% 7,000 28,400
25.0% 56,800 114,650 25.0% 28,400 68,800
28.0% 114,650 174,700 28.0% 68,800 143,500
33.0% 174,700 311,950 33.0% 143,500 311,950
35.0% 311,950 - 35.0% 311,950 -
Table 25: Marginal tax rates, 2003
Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
10.0% 0 17,400 10.0% 0 8,700
15.0% 17,400 70,700 15.0% 8,700 35,350
25.0% 70,700 142,700 25.0% 35,350 85,650
28.0% 142,700 217,450 28.0% 85,650 178,650
33.0% 217,450 388,350 33.0% 178,650 388,350
35.0% 388,350 - 35.0% 388,350 -
Table 26: Marginal tax rates, 2012
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Married Single
MTR Greater than Less than MTR Greater than Less than
10.0% 0 17,850 10.0% 0 8,925
15.0% 17,850 72,500 15.0% 8,925 36,250
25.0% 72,500 146,400 25.0% 36,250 87,850
28.0% 146,400 223,050 28.0% 87,850 183,250
33.0% 223,050 398,350 33.0% 183,250 398,350
35.0% 398,350 450,000 35.0% 398,350 400,000
39.6% 450,000 - 39.6% 400,000 -
Table 27: Marginal tax rates, 2013
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